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Abstract 
The article concentrates on court cases with litigants in person (lay people who act on their 
own behalf in legal proceedings without a counsel or solicitor) and discusses the challenges 
of building a corpus of courtroom discourse where it is crucial to distinguish between 
speakers due to their distinct institutional roles. The corpus incorporates seven sub-corpora of 
verbatim transcripts from different court cases with litigants in person and comprises over 11 
million tokens. The focus of the article is on the interplay between the legal and lay discourse 
types and how judges project their institutional roles through ‘well’-initiated turns directed at 
litigants in person and counsels. As a versatile discourse marker, ‘well’ provides a good 
opportunity to explore how judges have to adapt their roles to ensure lay litigants in person 
receive the necessary support and that their lack of competence does not impede on the 
fairness of the proceedings. Given the breadth and importance of the topic of litigation in 
person, the article discusses how the tools and approaches of corpus linguistics can be helpful 
in this multi-disciplinary area where multiple functions and uses of individual linguistic 
features need to be explored in depth.  
Keywords 
Discourse markers, corpus linguistics, specialised corpora, institutional role of judges, 
litigants in person. 
1 Introduction  
Due to abrupt cuts in legal aid in England and Wales since July 2013 as a result of the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, civil courts are now struggling with 
the influx of lay people who act on their own behalf in legal proceedings without counsel or a 
solicitor (i.e. as litigants in person). The changes have an adverse impact on society as a 
whole as well as individuals, and raise serious concerns about the fairness of proceedings and 
access to justice. This is further complicated by the fact that research on the phenomenon of 
litigation in person is scarce and official reports (e.g. Report by the Judicial Working Group 
on Litigants in Person 2013) struggle to recognise the complex and multi-disciplinary 
character of the topic. Communication and interaction between the parties lies at the core of 
adversarial legal proceedings. The mere presence of litigants in person introduces many 
imbalances in power relations and affects the institutional roles of all participants involved, 
especially those of the judiciary. 
The corpus discussed in this study was designed to bridge the gap between linguistic research 
on courtroom discourse and legal research on litigants in person. Real life communication is 
often overlooked in legal studies whereas linguistic studies may not have real impact for legal 
practitioners. This study attempts to bridge the gap by combining the analysis of i) authentic 
communication in court, and ii) the use of language for the strategic purposes of legal 
  
practitioners. For instance, corpus samples of interaction between judges and litigants in 
person can be used in the training of the judiciary on dealing with litigants in person at the 
Judicial College. The vision behind the corpus building was to meet the needs of both 
linguists and legal practitioners and create a tool for conducting multi-disciplinary research. 
Although the corpus at this stage has some limitations (see section 3), an analysis of the 
discourse marker ‘well’ shows that it can nevertheless illustrate different aspects of the 
interplay between legal and lay discourse types. The focus here is on the function of ‘well’ in 
its turn-initial position as used by judges in court proceedings with an unrepresented party.  
Discourse markers in general and ‘well’ in particular are well-suited for indicating the 
participants’ strategies of negotiating their institutional roles. Although discourse markers are 
semantically and grammatically optional and can be omitted without causing any deviations 
in meaning or irregularities in syntax (Fraser 1993: 6; Schourup 1998: 231), they play an 
important function in orienting the listeners and defining the force of the utterance (Norrick 
2000; Hale 1999). Finding a unified definition for discourse markers is problematic since 
they do not form a unified group and differ significantly from their correlates (e.g. discourse 
marker ‘like’ v. its correlate verb ‘like’, discourse marker ‘well’ v. its correlate adverb ‘well’, 
discourse marker ‘so’ v. its correlate conjunction ‘so’). Moreover, a single discourse marker 
can often be found to display a wide variety of uses and functions (Fraser 1993;  Schourup 
1998).  
The core meaning of discourse markers (Fraser 1999) presents yet another puzzle for 
researchers because in pragmatic terms it is not always clear whether the meaning of the 
marker is intrinsic or influenced by the context (Cuenca 2008: 1373). What is important for 
this study, though, is that discourse markers are often indicative of power relationships as 
they help structure and control the interaction as well as negotiate the roles of speakers 
(Carter and McCarthy 2006: 212). Studies on the use of discourse markers in different social 
contexts and settings show that the role of speakers and their relationship influences the use 
and distribution of discourse markers (Carranza 2004; Fuller 2003). For instance, Fuller 
(2003) shows that in conversation the discourse marker ‘well’ is found to occur frequently in 
responses (i.e. second turn position), whereas in interviews it is used more often by the 
interviewer (i.e. first turn position).  
The discourse marker ‘well’ is one of the most frequently studied discourse markers due to its 
versatile use and high occurrence in everyday conversation (Kim 2013; Jackson and Jones 
2012; Lam 2010; Fuller 2003; Cuenca 2007; Schiffrin 1987; Svartvik 1980) as well as spoken 
interaction in institutional settings including interviews (Jackson and Jones 2012; Fuller 
2003; Schiffrin 1987) and courtroom discourse (Innes 2010; Hale 1999). It has been studied 
as a turn-initial discourse marker occurring in all three positions: first pair part of adjacency 
pairs (Innes 2010; Hale 1999), second pair part (Innes 2010; Schiffrin 1987) and also third 
turn (Kim 2013).  
In its textual function, the discourse marker ‘well’ introduces a change of topic (Fuller 2003), 
reinforces coherence links (Fuller 200; Schiffrin 1987; Lam 2010) or is used as a delay 
device when a speaker needs to pause (Cuenca 2008; Fuller 2003). The interpersonal 
  
functions of ‘well’ are mainly those of (i) a responsive marker, prefacing answers indicating 
insufficiency or incompleteness, or (ii) an emotive marker, conveying the speaker’s surprise, 
dismissal or state of mind in general (Lam 2010). The interactional functions of the discourse 
marker ‘well’ range from (i) self-repair, self-correction and reformulation (Jackson and Jones 
2013) to (ii) turn-management and taking the floor (Lam 2010). The discourse marker ‘well’ 
also holds an important pragmatic function, i.e. to initiate face threat mitigation (Jucker 1993; 
Fuller 2003; Innes 2010; Cuenca 2008). Given its wide range of textual, interpersonal, 
interactional, and pragmatic functions, turn initial ‘well’ provides scope for exploring how 
judges adapt their professional roles when dealing with litigants in person. Section 2 provides 
a more detailed reasoning of how the discourse marker ‘well’ in its different functions helps 
negotiate or establish institutional roles of the participants in courtroom settings, and section 
5 illustrates different functions of ‘well’-initiated turns as used by judges in courtroom 
proceedings with litigants in person.  
 
2 Previous research on the legal-lay discourse in courtroom settings and the role of 
discourse markers  
There is little research on communication challenges experienced by litigants in person, the 
judiciary, court staff or opposing counsels in court proceedings with an unrepresented party. 
Even the most recent publication on legal-lay discourse, an edited volume by Heffer et al 
(2013) Legal–lay communication: textual travels in the law, does not mention difficulties 
litigation in person brings to the judiciary and courts. Although the edited volume is a useful 
source of information on many communication issues arising from differences in legal and 
lay discourse types in a variety of contexts (e.g. police interviews, public hearings), the 
omission of self-representation as a topic shows an important gap in the research—a gap 
which this paper attempts to bridge. 
Research dealing directly with linguistic aspects of litigation in person is limited to two short 
studies on small claims courts (O’Barr and Conley 1990; Conley and O’Barr 1998) and 
research conducted by the author (Tkačuková 2011, 2010, 2008, 2007). The first two studies 
concentrate on narrative structures and conclude that litigants in person use narrative devices 
common in everyday conversational interaction and therefore produce relational accounts 
instead of using narrative devices of rule-oriented accounts expected by the judiciary (e.g. 
self-represented litigants describe their feelings instead of limiting themselves to the facts). 
This is in line with Heffer’s (2005: 20–24) observation of the tension between the 
paradigmatic (socio-scientific) mode of reasoning employed by legal professionals and the 
narrative mode of reasoning often used by lay participants (e.g. witnesses, jury members). 
Similar to the findings of O’Barr and Conley (1990), single case studies conducted by the 
author (Tkačuková 2011, 2010, 2008, 2007) found that there is a disparity between the rules 
of everyday conversational discourse and pre-specified requirements of courtroom discourse. 
As a result, litigants in person, typically find it challenging to adapt their interactional habits 
and language use to the hostile atmosphere of cross-examination when it is necessary to 
  
discredit witnesses or their presentation of facts (Gibbons 2003). Professional counsels 
challenge witnesses by asking them closed leading questions and limiting their interactional 
space (Heffer 2005: ch.4; Luchjenbroers 1997; Philips 1987; Woodbury 1984; Harris 1984; 
Danet et al 1980) and coercing them into preferred replies by using controlling pragmatic 
strategies (Aldridge and Luchjenbroers 2007; Matoesian 2005; Gibbons 2003: 112 – 127; 
Cotterill 2003; Drew 1990; Conley and O’Barr 1998). Instead, the litigants in person in 
Tkačuková’s data, based on the libel case McDonalds v Helen Steel ad David Morris, 
allowed too much interactional space for witnesses, used too many open questions and their 
closed questions were not restrictive enough (Tkačuková 2011, 2010). This is also reflected 
in their use of discourse markers. Hale (1999) notes that common discourse markers such as 
‘well’ are used to signal coherence in everyday conversation, whereas in cross-examination 
the same discourse markers are used in their more challenging functions for indicating 
disagreement and controlling the flow of questioning. Tkačuková (2010) illustrates that 
discourse markers are used by litigants in person in their supportive function to indicate 
comprehension and acknowledgement during cross-examination instead of adding force to 
the challenging questioning. For the very fact that litigants in person were not always 
challenging enough, the judge had to interfere in their cross-examination and ask specifying 
questions.  
The above-mentioned studies on litigants in person focus on the evidentiary stage of the 
proceedings (i.e. witness examination stages). The use and functions of discourse markers 
during the evidentiary stage have been analysed in several studies (Innes 2010; Hale 1999 
Tkačuková 2010). In contrast, the focus of this article is on procedural stages (discussions 
between litigants in person, opposing counsels and judges about legal points and 
organisational matters). It is during procedural stages that most distinctions between legal and 
lay discourse types arise because judges need to ensure litigants in person are not 
disadvantaged due to their lack of legal training. The functions of discourse markers can thus 
indicate the roles of judges in cases with litigants in person.   
The discourse marker ‘well’ in its initial position is especially well-placed for illustrating the 
interactional and communicative interplay between legal and lay participants. The reasons are 
numerous. Firstly, the discourse marker ‘well’ frequently occurs both in paradigmatic and 
narrative modes; it has a firmly established place in question/answer driven institutional 
settings such as court (Innes 2010) or interviews (Fuller 2003) as well as everyday 
conversation (Jackson and Jones 2013; Kim 2013; Fuller 2003; Schiffrin 1987; Svartvik 
1980) or even storytelling (Norrick 2001).    
Secondly, the discourse marker ‘well’ in its turn-initial position can help signal turn-taking 
management. Turn-taking in courtroom settings is strictly pre-specified with turn order and 
distribution of turns pre-allocated to speakers with specific roles (e.g. witnesses answer 
questions and are not permitted to offer any other types of contributions, counsel ask 
questions) and overlapping speech is avoided by counsel employing such remedial techniques 
as cut-offs or re-starts to restore the turn-taking order (Atkinson and Drew 1979: 67). 
Litigants in person have, however, been found to follow turn-taking management common in 
everyday conversation, which is less orderly and lacks many pre-allocated aspects 
  
(Tkačuková 2010). They often interrupted witnesses or were interrupted by witnesses and 
their witness examination was thus disorderly (Tkačuková 2008). Judges were also found to 
interrupt witness examination conducted by litigant in person in order to ask witnesses 
additional questions or interfere with litigant in person’s questioning strategies (Tkačuková 
2010). In its function as a cohesive link between turns (Fuller 2003; Schiffrin 1987) and an 
initiator of self-repairs (Jackson and Jones 2013), ‘well’ is indicative of the turn-taking 
management during interaction between legal professionals and litigants in person.  
There are two more functions of the discourse marker ‘well’ which often stand out in the 
interplay between the legal and lay discourse types and interaction styles: ‘well’ indicating 
inequalities  in the institutional authority of the interlocutors, and ‘well’ as a mitigation 
device. In its first function the discourse marker ‘well’ controls the flow of the interaction 
(Carter and McCarthy 2006: 212) and adds force to coercive questioning or challenging 
replies (Innes 2010; Hale 1999). One of the judges’ roles is to ensure litigants in person 
understand complicated legal concepts and principles related to their case. The orientation of 
the discourse marker ‘well’ backwards and forwards in specifying the meaning intended by 
the previous speaker and the current one (Schiffrin 1987) allows ‘well’-initiated turns to 
unfold the negotiation of meaning happening between judges and litigants in person.   
Furthermore, the function of ‘well’ as a mitigation device for toning down the potential face 
threat to the hearer (Innes 2010; Cuenca 2008; Fuller 2003; Jucker 1993) is especially 
important to legal scholars and practitioners. Due to the growing number of litigants in 
person, the traditional role of judges is currently undergoing change since judges increasingly 
have to undertake an additional role of being the main facilitator of the legal process and 
mitigator between the legal parties. Among other suggestions, the first official report by the 
Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person (2013) advocates developing training for 
judges and court staff on dealing with litigants in person within the newly established Judicial 
College. The mitigating function of the discourse marker ‘well’ has a special place in the 
legal-lay discourse where litigants in person are in a disadvantaged position and can 
potentially find themselves in many face-threatening situations with judges and opposing 
counsel requiring action from them.   
In general, linguistic research on the role of judges in legal proceedings with legal 
proceedings has been preoccupied by power inequalities, the difficulties of lay people with 
presenting their stories and the disparity between the paradigmatic and narrative modes in 
lay-legal discourse. Legal research on self-representation is more alert to potential 
complications litigants in person cause and the changing role of the judiciary. The discourse 
marker ‘well’ in all of its functions and versatile uses is in the ideal position to reflect all of 
the complexities of legal-lay interaction. Most importantly it has the potential to uncover 
mitigating strategies used by the judiciary and to show how judges negotiate the roles of 
litigants in person and the meaning of legal concepts.  
 
3 Data 
  
The corpus is based on verbatim transcripts from seven civil and criminal court cases 
transcribed by professional court transcribers. Civil cases are not generally audio recorded 
(with the exception of family cases, which are strictly confidential). Therefore the audio 
recordings were not available for the analysed cases. With the analysed criminal cases 
substantial effort was made to obtain recordings, but the recordings could not be released to 
researchers from abroad. It is extremely difficult to obtain even court transcripts due to a 
number of complications: the sensitive nature of the data and ethical considerations, the very 
high cost of transcription services, difficulties tracing case numbers of cases with litigants in 
person.  
Furthermore, conducting linguistic analysis based on verbatim transcripts is not ideal for the 
purposes of spoken discourse analysis and the accuracy of verbatim court transcripts has been 
questioned in many studies due to the nature of spoken language and the fact that transcripts 
are produced for purely legal purposes (Fraser 2003; Eades 1996; Walker 1986). Sometimes 
transcribers make conscious changes in the participants’ language. Reporter induced changes 
mostly include correction of inaccurate grammar, syntactic rearrangements or restoration of 
dialectal features into standard forms (Walker 1990: 228–232). The extent to which court 
reporters correct the speakers’ language depends on the type of the participant they 
transcribe. The language of legal professionals and expert witnesses, for instance, is corrected 
more often as these professionals are expected to express themselves better than ordinary lay 
participants (Heffer 2005: 56; Walker 1990: 232–234). Even including punctuation in the 
transcription makes transcripts dependent on the stenographers’ interpretation of an utterance 
(Fraser 2003; Eades 1996; Walker 1986). Interruptions are, for instance, usually indicated 
with dashes, but such a simplified system does not make it clear when exactly interruptions 
begin and for how long simultaneous speech lasts (Walker 1986: 211–213). However, these 
limitations are minimised by the fact that the current study concentrates on the formal 
features of interaction such as the use, function and occurrence of the discourse marker 
‘well’. In spite of the possibility of transcriber-induced correction, researchers consider court 
transcripts a valuable source for linguistic analysis (Eades 1996). From his observations in 
court, Heffer (2005: 58) concluded that in an overwhelming majority of cases the language 
presented in transcripts was accurate.  
The corpus used in this research consists of 12,338,166 words and is a collection of seven 
sub-corpora, each based on a court case tried in different jurisdictions (England and Wales, 
USA and Canada). Table 1 shows the list of cases analysed, their types, jurisdictions and sub-
corpus size. 
Table 1: List of sub-corpora outlining cases involving litigants in person (LiP) 
Case Case type Country Sub-corpus size 
McDonald’s Corporation v. 
Helen Steel and David Morris 
(McDonald’s Sub-Corpus) 
 
Libel   UK 9,005,850 tokens 
David Irving v. Penguin 
Books and Deborah Lipstadt  
Libel  UK 1,685,058 tokens 
  
(Irving Sub-Corpus) 
LiP v. an insurance company 
(Small Claims Sub-Corpus 1) 
Civil UK 43,812 tokens 
United States of America v. 
James A. Traficant 
(Traficant Sub-Corpus) 
Criminal USA 1,384,469 tokens 
LiP v. a cable 
communications company 
(Small Claims Sub-Corpus 2) 
 
Civil USA 116,868 tokens 
LiP v. family members 
(Small Claims Sub-Corpus 3) 
Criminal USA 36,013 tokens 
LiP v. an investment company 
(Small Claims Sub-Corpus 4) 
Civil Canada 66,096 tokens 
 
In the corpus, there are three long and widely-publicised cases in which litigants in person 
chose to represent themselves despite having other options available: McDonald’s 
Corporation v. Helen Steel and David Morris, David Irving v. Penguin Books and Deborah 
Lipstadt, United States of America v. James A. Traficant. The activists Steel and Morris 
chose to represent themselves after they were sued over the contents of the leaflets ‘What’s 
Wrong with McDonald’s? Everything they don’t Want you to Know’, which they were 
distributing in public. David Irving, a British historian publicly claiming his sympathy for 
anti-Semitism, filed a libel suit against Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt for being 
labelled a Holocaust denier. James Traficant, a politician and member of the US House of 
Representatives, represented himself when federal corruption charges were brought against 
him. The other cases are small claims cases, for which there is no extra-linguistic information 
available and the names were anonymised.  
Recent research conducted for the Ministry of Justice found that litigants in person coming 
from different educational, social and professional backgrounds, including those with high 
levels of education or professional experience, struggle with many aspects of the legal 
process (Trinder et al. 2014). Educational or professional background thus does not affect the 
individuals’ capacity to represent themselves. For this reason the sub-corpora are comparable 
and relevant for the analysis of the discourse marker as used by judges in their 
communication with litigants in person.  
The corpus is a work in progress which is being constantly supplemented with newly 
acquired verbatim transcripts. Each sub-corpus includes all stages of court cases, including 
evidentiary stages (witness examination), opening and closing statements and resolving 
procedural and organisational matters. Sub-corpora can be searched individually, in different 
combinations or as a whole corpus. Despite the differences in the size of individual sub-
corpora (caused by the duration of cases), jurisdictions, types of cases and types of litigants in 
person, the corpus as a whole presents a solid position for identifying specific problematic 
areas of court communication for litigants in person and the interplay between the legal and 
lay discourse types. 
  
 
4 Corpus linguistic approach and corpus design 
A corpus approach offers several advantages for dealing with novel and timely topics: an 
easy way for incorporating new materials, re-usability for different types of analyses and the 
quick speed of processing data (McEnery et al. 2006). This is especially important for the 
interdisciplinary topic of self-representation, which is rapidly gaining in significance and 
impacts on a wide and varied community of legal professionals, stakeholders, policy makers 
and academics. A corpus approach allows researchers to extract individual lexical features 
from texts, quantify them and then put them into the wider context by identifying regular 
patterns and analysing the role of formal features for specific communicative purposes in the 
given context (Thornbury 2010: 276). The bottom-up approach provides an objective basis 
for the analysis and eliminates weaknesses that are sometimes associated with discourse or 
pragmatic analysis, such as subjective conclusions, selective extraction of features or de-
contextualised examples (McEnery and Wilson 2001: 115). The research into smaller 
specialised corpora shows that more contextualised corpora are better suited for exploring 
specific linguistic features (Flowerdew 2004; Ma 1993). The use of small specialised corpora 
instead of big generic corpora is well-established in discourse analysis because researchers 
find it easier to rely on a smaller number of whole texts with detailed metadata about 
speakers (McEnery et al. 2006). 
Another advantage of corpus linguistics connected with objectivity is the necessity to 
thoroughly consider three main principles of corpus building: sampling, balancing and 
representativeness of the texts (Nelson, 2010: 56; McEnery et al. 2006: 13–21). Balancing 
and representativeness are of special importance to smaller specialised corpora such as the 
discussed corpus. The criterion of representativeness of a corpus is normally judged against 
the situational context and the linguistic context (Koester 2010: 69–71). The situational 
variability and representativeness of this specialised corpus are clearly determined by the 
focus on court cases with litigants in person who come from different social and educational 
backgrounds and opt for self-representation for different reasons. The corpus includes cases 
with well-educated and highly articulate litigants (i.e. David Irving and James Traficant used 
court as a forum for expressing their views despite having financial means for legal 
presentation); activists (i.e. Helen Steel and David Morris who chose to represent themselves 
because of their strong belief in the freedom of speech); and ordinary litigants in person who 
chose to represent themselves in typical small claims cases because of a lack of financial 
means. The representativeness of the linguistic context is ensured by the fact that all sub-
corpora include court hearings from the very beginning until the end and are thus 
representative of the evidentiary dialogic stages (witness examination) and monologic stages 
(opening and closing speeches) as well as procedural stages (discussions between the parties 
and the judge about order of witnesses, legal arguments, admissibility of evidence, etc). Since 
the differences between the paradigmatic and the narrative modes are of a universal character 
(Heffer 2005), litigants in person across different jurisdictions can be expected to have 
similar problems with communication in court.  
  
The principles of sampling and balancing are interconnected as both refer to choosing 
appropriate texts which represent a wide range of typical situations (McEnery 2006: 125). 
The sampling of the corpus was largely determined by the availability of courtroom materials 
and the motivation to include whole cases from different jurisdictions. The importance of 
including whole texts for the contextually-informed analysis when it is necessary to examine 
linguistic features within the text is supported by Flowerdew (2004: 15). The opportunity to 
compare how judges deal with the needs of litigants in person in different jurisdictions is 
especially valuable for legal professionals, stakeholders and practitioners as each jurisdiction 
uses a slightly different approach and the results are visible in interaction between litigants in 
person and judges. For now, the corpus is limited to only a few cases from several 
jurisdictions and thus cannot fully function for the needs of comparative legal studies. This 
use can be further explored in future.  
Balancing the corpus as such remains a weakness because of the differences in sizes of 
individual cases and the variety of cases. But the corpus is a starting point for the project in 
progress and this weakness is counterbalanced by the fact that it is possible to search 
individual sub-corpora or combinations of them and thus control the input data. Since there is 
no objective or unified method to measure the representativeness of the corpus, it is the 
research question that determines the criteria for corpus building, balancing, sampling and 
representativeness (McEnery 2006: 21). The design of the corpus was thus adjusted to enable 
the answering of research questions from both disciplines, i.e. linguistics and socio-legal 
studies. 
When designing the corpus the main challenge proved to be dealing with dialogic materials 
as it was necessary to divide the utterances in the transcripts into individual sentences 
according to the punctuation (sentence was defined as a sequence of words staring with a 
capital letter and ending with a full stop for simplification purposes). The choice of a 
sentence as a unit of analysis was guided by the need for an interdisciplinary and varied 
approach to data: research questions the corpus needed to answer were on the syntactical 
level. With the transcripts divided into sentences, it is easier to organise data, assign speakers 
to utterances, categorise types of utterances, categorise types of questions during witness 
examination, assign pragmatic marks ups, etc. Such basic division into sentences is 
problematic from the linguistic point of view as it does not account for discourse units. 
Pragmatic annotation would have been more functional if the corpus was designed for purely 
linguistic purposes. But the corpus would then not be easily applicable for answering research 
questions for socio-legal studies, where a fully automated annotation is an advantage for 
working with many varied cases. A basic simplified division proved to be more flexible for 
the reusability of the corpus. 
Each sentence was marked up with four categories (‘type’, ‘category’, ‘speaker’, ‘comment’) 
for a combination of automatic and manual tagging. The outlay and regular punctuation of 
verbatim transcripts with exact indication of speakers allowed for speakers and categories to 
be assigned automatically to each sentence. Speakers were tagged as ‘witness’, ‘judge’, 
‘counsel’ or ‘litigant in person’. The division into categories according to types of utterances 
(‘q’ for questions, ‘a’ for answers and ‘o’ for other types of utterances) was a key step which 
  
helped distinguish between witness examination stages and procedural stages. This, for 
instance, allows the analyst to see how litigants in person negotiate their institutionally 
ambiguous role when examining other lay people (i.e. witnesses) and when discussing legal 
points and procedural matters with the judge and the opposing counsel. The mark-up category 
‘type’ was reserved for types of questions and was tagged manually in a selected sub-corpus 
of cross-examination (described in Tkačuková 2010); the ‘comment’ mark up space was used 
for additional tags for pragmatic and semantic strategies and allows for a flexible manual 
tagging system which could fit the aims of potential future studies: 
<s comment="" speaker="counsel" category="question" type=""> Ms. Bobby, when you 
testified last week, do you recall a series of questions and answers that were asked to you 
about the relationship between Charles O'Nesti and Congressman Traficant? </s><s 
comment="" speaker="Smith" category="question" type=""> You recall that series of 
questions and answers? </s>A. <s comment="" speaker="witness" category="a" > Yes. </s>  
The marked up documents were then tagged for parts of speech using TreeTagger (Schmid 
1994) and uploaded into the corpus query system Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff 2014). As a 
result, the corpus and sub-corpora are now searchable according to different combinations of 
the following features: speakers, types of interaction, lemmas, words, phrases and making 
attribute-value queries specific for the Sketch Engine. The corpus required an individual 
approach to corpus building and a specific annotation system. But once designed it functions 
as a fully reusable source of information for an interdisciplinary analysis fulfilling the 
requirements of both disciplinary bases (i.e. linguistics and legal studies). The main 
advantage of the corpus is that it can be re-applied to answer research questions not originally 
envisaged (McEnery 2006: 30). 
 
5 Discourse marker ‘well’ in legal-lay discourse 
As mentioned in section 2, the focus of the article is on the roles of judges during procedural 
stages as evidenced through their use of ‘well’-initiated turns. TkačukováTable 2 provides a 
general overview of the occurrences of ‘well’ in the turn-initial position according to the roles 
of speakers and all court hearing stages: 
Table 2: Normalised frequency of the discourse marker ‘well’ in turn-initial position 
(normalised per million). 
 McDonalds 
sub-corpus 
(per million) 
Irving sub-corpus 
(per million) 
Traficant 
sub-corpus  
(per million) 
Small claims 
sub-corpora 
(per million) 
Witnesses – under 
witness examination 
(‘well’ in second 
turns) 
 411.1  464.1  550.4 61.4 
LiPs – conducting 
witness examination  
32.1  104.4  151.7  49.8 
  
(‘well’ in first turns) 
LiPs – procedural 
discussions 
40.8  46.9  96.8  12.7 
LiPs in total 72.8  151.3  248.5  62.5 
Counsel – 
conducting witness 
examination 
(‘well’ in first turns) 
   
12.8  
 
83.1  
 
54.2  
 
18.4 
Counsel – 
procedural 
discussions 
7.3  22.0  13.7  3.1 
Counsel in total 20.1  105.0  67.9  21.5 
Judges – additional 
questions for 
witnesses 
(‘well’ in first turns) 
 
14.1  
 
62.3  
 
122.8  
 
9.4 
Judges – procedural 
discussions 
60.3  139.5  331.5  20.7 
Judges in total 74.4  201.8  459.4  30.1 
 
The figures show that during witness examination ‘well’ is most frequently used by witnesses 
to initiate their second turns. In the first part of adjacency pairs, i.e. questioning turns, 
litigants in person use ‘well’ most frequently. Counsels use ‘well’ at least twice less than 
litigants in person. This could indicate that lay participants, witnesses and litigants in person, 
use ‘well’ most frequently because they are phrasing their narratives in the narrative mode. 
The paradigmatic mode of counsels’ turns is more structured and does not require much self-
correction, delays or rephrasing. Counsels mainly use ‘well’ to reinforce the challenging 
force of their cross-examining questions (Tkačuková 2010). The figures are comparable to 
those presented by Innes (2010), who provides a detailed overview of the functions, uses and 
frequencies of the discourse marker ‘well’ used by counsel and witnesses (i.e. uses of ‘well’ 
in its first turn and second turn positions). The findings in Innes (2010: 104) show that in its 
first turn position, ‘well’ is used mainly to challenge the witness, whereas in its second 
position ‘well’ introduces a delay tactic or justification/explanation.  
Although ‘well’ is much more frequently used by witnesses, litigant in person and counsels 
during witness examination, the situation is different during procedural discussions. The 
shaded rows in Table 2 illustrate that during procedural stages judges use ‘well’ in the turn-
initial position approximately twice more than litigants in person and at least three times 
more than counsels. This is consistent with the fact that judges are the main contributors in 
the procedural and organisational stage of hearings and both parties turn to them for making 
decisions and litigants in person in particular expect their guidance and suggestions. The 
focus on judges’ ‘well’-initiated turns during procedural discussions illustrates additional 
roles judges have to undertake in cases with litigants in person.  
The Sketch Engine offers a function for identifying collocations by setting the range of words 
preceding and/or following the word in question, the number of minimal occurrences of the 
  
collocation in the corpus and in the given range. The collocations are then listed according to 
different association scores. For the purposes of this study the following three scores are of 
special importance: MI score, T-score and logDice score. The first two are common 
association scores. The MI score is not dependent on the size of the corpus and identifies 
lexical bundles and idiomatic occurrences, whereas the T-score is corpus-specific and bears 
more information about the grammatical use of the word. The logDice score is a modification 
of the Dice score. The logDice is based on several measures: the frequency of the precise 
relation, the frequency of the headword in the same syntactic position with any collocation 
and the frequencies of the collocation in any syntactic position (Rychly 2008). This was thus 
found to be the most reliable score for small specialised corpora such as the present corpus 
because it combines grammatical and lexical criteria.  
A combination of these scores was used to identify the left-hand and right-hand context of the 
discourse marker ‘well’ in turn-initial positions as used by judges. Punctuation marks (full 
stop, dashes and question marks) rank highest by all three association measures for the left-
hand context (L4–L1) in the data. Table 3 shows the top three results are ranked according to 
the logDice score: 
Table 3: Association measures for left-hand context of ‘well’-initiated turns used by judges 
ranked according to the logDice score. 
 
Freq T-score MI logDice 
. 562 16.999 3.73 4.71 
? 175 7.078 3.207 4.182 
----- 126 6.069 6.016 6.92 
 
As established in section 2, court transcribers use a varied number of dashes to indicate 
interruptions in verbatim transcripts and their occurrence preceding ‘well’-initiated turns 
signifies the use of ‘well’ for taking the floor and interrupting the previous speaker. The 
occurrence of the question mark then mainly applies to instances of judges interjecting 
witness examination in order to inquire about its course or ask specifying questions. Table 4 
shows the proportion of ‘well’-initiated interjections and interruptions by judges. The first 
two rows show judges’ ‘well’-initiated interjections of Q/A sequences during witness 
examination, whereas the last two rows show the rate of judges’ ‘well’-initiated mid-turn 
interruptions during procedural discussions.  
Table 4: The proportion of ‘well’-initiated interjections and interruptions by judges (LiPs 
stands for litigants in person). 
  McDonalds 
sub-corpus 
Irving sub-
corpus 
Traficant 
sub-corpus 
Small claims 
sub-corpus 
Judges interjecting LiPs’ 
witness examination  
87.8% 79.9% 67.3% 89.9% 
Judges interjecting counsels’ 
witness examination  
12.2% 20.01% 32.7% 10.1% 
  
Judges’ mid-turn 
interruptions of LiPs in 
procedural stages 
59.5% 63.7% 58.9% 78.3% 
Judges’ mid-turn 
interruptions of counsels in 
procedural stages 
40.5% 36.3% 41.1% 21.7% 
 
Judges interrupt litigants in person and counsels in similar proportions during procedural 
discussions. But the rate of judges interjecting litigants in person’s witness examination is 
much higher across all the cases. This may be due to the fact that judges need to complement 
the litigants in persons’ witness examination by asking witnesses additional questions. 
Another reason for judges to interrupt litigants’ in person witness examination is to control its 
course by pointing out relevant aspects to their decision-making and ensuring court time is 
used more efficiently, as illustrated in Example 1: 
Example 1 (Irving Sub-Corpus 2): The judge interferes with the litigant in person’s (Irving’s) 
cross-examination of a witness. 
MR IRVING: I am dangerous to the whole of existing history of the Holocaust? Is that what 
is implied by that?  
MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, that is, in the end, a matter for me, what Professor Lipstadt 
would have been understood to mean, but it seems to me it is pretty clear that the danger is 
that a lot of people will -- I was going to use the word "swallow", that is a bit offensive -- 
accept the denial case.  
 
In example 1, the judge interferes with Mr Irving’s cross-examination by saying clearly 
which aspects are to be left to him. By doing so, the judge reinforces his authority implying 
that it is ultimately his decision. The discourse marker projects the judge’s stance to the line 
of questioning chosen by the litigant in person and the redundancy and limited value of 
Irving’s cross-examination questions to his decision making. Reinforcing their role as 
decision-makers is the predominant function judges employ in ‘well’-initiated interruptions 
of counsels as shown in Example 2: 
 
Example 2 (McDonalds Sub-Corpus 1): Judge’s mid-turn interruption of the counsel during 
procedural discussions.   
 
MR. RAMPTON : With respect, I do not accept that. I will dutifully -----  
MR. JUSTICE BELL: Well, that is my ruling.  
MR. RAMPTON: If that is your Lordship 's ruling, I dutifully obey. 
 
The judge interrupts counsel to briefly state that there is no point in objecting to his ruling 
and ‘well’ helps indicate the force of the proposition expressed by the judge, which counsel 
accepts as an irreversible position. Projecting their firm stance and re-enforcing their 
authority is the main function of judges’ ‘well’ initiated mid-turn interruptions: they amount 
to almost 70% of all their ‘well’-initiated mid-turn interruptions directed at counsel. When 
directing their speech to litigants in person judges follow further objectives; judges need to 
  
ensure that there are no misunderstandings and that hearings are not strongly impeded by the 
lay people’s lack of legal knowledge, experience or training.  
While the left-hand context of ‘well’ illustrates when judges take the floor and how they 
control the flow of interaction, the right-hand context (R1–R5) helps identify different 
functions of judge’s ‘well’-initiated turns. The results in Table 5 are ranked according to the 
logDice score:  
Table 5: Association measures for right-hand context of ‘well’-initiated turns used by judges 
ranked according to the logDice score. 
 
Freq T-
score 
MI logDice 
 
Freq T-
score 
MI logDice 
n't 326 7.389 4.21
1 
7.587 be 303 3.66 3.555 4.503 
may 50 4.275 4.50
1 
5.431 know 46 3.651 3.521 4.47 
think 78 5.371 4.30
9 
5.262 what 56 4.64 3.473 4.436 
, 1004 21.215 4.23
5 
5.215 could 32 3.508 3.408 4.358 
will 63 4.726 4.19
1 
5.139 not 170 7.525 3.313 4.289 
put 29 2.977 4.08
9 
4.994 it 177 7.873 3.282 4.258 
I 369 12.152 3.93
9 
4.917 just 32 3.079 3.17 4.118 
do 154 6.158 3.80
2 
4.769 if 48 3.75 3.107 4.067 
we 98 5.704 3.74
3 
4.709 have 91 5.604 3.002 3.976 
can 51 4.533 3.74
3 
4.699 you 131 6.828 2.991 3.967 
there 70 5.042 3.65
4 
4.617 would 35 2.414 1.877 2.844 
 
The top collocations for the right-hand context with the highest logDice score and association 
scores include the following words: pronouns  ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’; verbs ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘have’; 
conjunction ‘if’; negation form ‘not’, ‘n’t’; modal verbs ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘may’, ‘would’. The 
frequent occurrence and close association of these words with ‘well’ coincide with different 
functions of the discourse marker: explanation (‘think’, ‘know’, ‘have’), instructions (‘have’, 
‘you’), suggestions (modal verbs, ‘if’), mitigation (‘we’, modal verbs, ‘think’), disagreement 
(forms of negation). 
To meet the needs of the interdisciplinary topic, the examples were further classified on two 
levels. The overarching categorisation is according to institutional functions that judges 
perform through ‘well’-initiated turns. Subordinate to it is the categorisation according to 
  
linguistic functions of ‘well’. The first tier of categorisation is thus guided by the roles of 
judges according to the civil procedure rules for legal proceedings with an unrepresented 
party (Trinder et al. 2014; Zuckerman 2014). The second tier of categorisation is adapted 
from the linguistic research by Innes (2010), Lam (2010) and Fuller (2003): textual function 
of introducing the topic; textual function of linking and establishing coherence; responsive 
interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness; emotive interpersonal function of 
challenge/dismissal/state of mind; interactional function of reformulation; interactional 
function of turn-management; and pragmatic function of threat mitigation. The two-tier 
classification meets the needs of both disciplinary bases (i.e. linguistics and legal studies). 
Table 6 shows the overlaps between the legal and linguistic categorisations. There are often 
several linguistic functions corresponding to a single legal function of ‘well’-initiated turns 
used by judges. Examples below illustrate one linguistic function from each legal category.  
Table 6: Legal and linguistic classification of ‘well’-initiated turns as used by judges during 
interaction with litigants in person (LiP).  
Legal function: Providing advice/guidance/explanation on legal points/concepts 
Linguistic functions:  
- Textual function of introducing the topic 
- Textual function of linking and establishing coherence 
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
11.4% 12.9% 14.5% 4.8% 
Example 3 (Small Claims Sub-Corpus 2): 
- Textual function of linking and establishing coherence 
LiP: In regards to opening statement, that is my opening statement and I can say and present 
my case in a manner that would ---- 
THE COURT: Well, opening statement is just what it says. It's a statement of your position 
as far as what your case is about or what you contend your case is about. Some people say 
it's like a road map of their case. You cannot testify during it, and you cannot make 
arguments. There is a difference between an opening statement and a closing argument. So 
you cannot make an argument, but you can lay out the facts as you allege the facts to be. 
Legal function: Providing advice/guidance/explanation on procedural matters 
Linguistic functions:  
- Textual function of introducing the topic 
- Textual function of linking and establishing coherence 
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
37.2% 19.7% 23.9% 30.9% 
Example 4 (Traficant Sub-Corpus): 
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
MR. TRAFICANT: The tape recording of the dying man who they were able to tape but not 
make available for me to tape and depose.  
THE COURT: Well, the way you're putting it has not in itself been presented to me, but we 
have not ruled that -- I have a conditional ruling on evidence that is conditioned on the 
Government being able to demonstrate certain things that the law requires them to 
  
demonstrate under these circumstances. It was a pretty straight forward ruling, and you'll see 
it when you go back on the docket. 
Legal function: Giving instructions/suggestions as to (in)appropriateness and 
(in)effectiveness 
Linguistic functions:  
- Textual function of introducing the topic 
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
- Interactional function of turn-management 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
24.9% 21.2% 13.2% 28.9% 
Example 5 (McDonalds Sub-Corpus): 
- Interactional function of turn-management 
MS. STEEL: I do not think it should necessarily be assumed that he was from America. He 
could be from -----  
MR. JUSTICE BELL: Well, ask about that if you like. I do not want to interrupt your cross-
examination, but one thing you might ask is where Mr. Copeland arrived from, to the best of 
Mr. Mehigan's knowledge. 
Example 6 (Irving Sub-Corpus): 
- Textual function of introducing the topic 
MR IRVING: It is the way Morland J would put it probably too.  
MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, you might then take the opportunity, either in cross-
examination or perhaps re-examining yourself, to make the points you are wanting to make 
in reference to Professor Levin or Dr Levin's report. 
Legal function: Give rulings, reinforcing authority  
Linguistic functions:  
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
- Emotive interpersonal function of challenge/dismissal/state of mind 
- Pragmatic function of threat mitigation 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
4.6% 8.9% 14.6% 3.5% 
Example 7 (Small Claims Sub-Corpus 4): 
- Emotive interpersonal function of challenge/dismissal/state of mind 
MR. C.: Okay. But he did answer it. 
THE COURT: Well, the legal effect of that, I will sort out.  
MR. C.: Okay.  
THE COURT: He said what he said. 
Legal function: Mitigating, resolving issues between parties   
Linguistic functions:  
- Pragmatic function of threat mitigation 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
7.8% 13.2% 6.8% 11.3% 
Example 8 (McDonalds Sub-Corpus): 
RAMPTON: It is sometimes necessary to say things rather than often necessary to say things 
which may be provocative but which nevertheless it is necessary to say.  
MR.  JUSTICE BELL: Well, we have been in this courtroom a long time together, we are 
going to be here for many months more, and anything which those conducting the case, 
  
either counsel or the Defendants themselves, can do to keep the temperature at a steady level 
showing some mutual respect and courtesy is to be welcomed by me. 
Legal function: Challenging, expressing disagreement with the proposition 
expressed by LiPs  
Linguistic functions:  
- Responsive interpersonal function of insufficiency/incompleteness 
- Emotive interpersonal function of challenge/dismissal/state of mind 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
9.7% 19.3% 16.4% 10.1% 
Example 9 (Irving Sub-Corpus): 
- Emotive interpersonal function of challenge/dismissal/state of mind 
Mr Irving: Yes, but the left wing –  
MR JUSTICE GRAY: Well, do not argue about it, we have the evidence. 
Legal function: Other  
Linguistic functions:  
- Textual function of introducing the topic 
- Textual function of linking and establishing coherence  
- Interactional function of reformulation 
- Interactional function of turn-management 
McDonalds sub-corpus Irving sub-corpus Traficant sub-corpus Small claims sub-
corpus 
4.4% 4.8% 10.6% 10.5% 
Example 10 (Small Claims Sub-Corpus 4): 
MR. C.: Well, now, who is on first?  
THE COURT: Well, Mr. W. is going to call Mr. P., and then you will cross-examine him. 
 
The above examples show that although ‘well’ could be omitted, it is significant for defining 
the force of the propositions expressed. In Examples 3 and 4, the discourse marker introduces 
the judges’ explanation of legal concepts or procedural matters. In addition to introducing the 
explanation of the concept of ‘opening statement’ in Example 3, the discourse marker ‘well’ 
performs the textual function of establishing coherence. In Example 4, the discourse marker 
directs towards the insufficiency of the litigant in person’s previous turn. What both examples 
have in common is the need to clarify a complex issue for litigants in person. The judges 
should thus preferably formulate their explanation in the narrative mode (e.g. comparing 
opening statements to road maps in Example 3). Both examples, however, contain lexical and 
syntactic patterns of the professional paradigmatic mode (e.g. ‘layout the facts as you allege 
the facts to be’, ‘conditional ruling on evidence that is conditioned on the Government being 
able to demonstrate’). Authentic samples from courtroom interactions extracted from corpora 
can be used for the purposes of training judges to illustrate how they can explain common 
concepts or procedures to lay people. Since the second category of providing guidance on 
procedural matters is the most frequently employed function of ‘well’ initiated turns, it is 
important for judges to ensure their explanation of procedures can be easily understood by 
litigants in person.  
  
In Example 5 the discourse marker ‘well’ is followed by an imperative and in Example 6 by 
the modal verb ‘might’. Both judges introduce suggestions as to preferable and more 
effective options litigants in person might want to take. In Example 5, this is further 
reinforced by the turn-managing function of ‘well’. Similarly, Example 6 illustrates ‘well’ in 
its textual function of introducing the topic. Examples 7, 8 and 9 illustrate that amongst the 
multiple judges’ roles are ascertaining their authority through making firm decisions 
(Examples 7 and 9) but also through being mitigators between the parties (Example 8). 
Example 10 shows one of legally unspecific uses ‘well’, to which only linguistic functions 
were assigned.  
The analysis only relates to ‘well’-initiated turns used by judges. But by combining linguistic 
and legal approaches, Table 6 gives an indication of what roles are most common for judges 
in cases with litigants in person and how they engage with litigants in person. The results 
show that (i) providing guidance on procedural matters and (ii) giving suggestions as to 
(in)effectiveness of arguments or undertakings are the most frequent roles of judges in cases 
with litigants in person. This resonates with the findings by Trinder et al (2014). For the 
purposes of training the judiciary, samples of real-life interaction from court can serve as 
useful examples to discuss and learn from.   
Conclusions  
Procedural stages are important for negotiating meaning and institutional roles through legal-
lay communication. Judges’ ‘well’-initiated turns show that judges often reinforce their 
authority when directing their speech to counsel and provide explanation or advice when 
talking to litigants in person. The most frequent roles judges undertake through ‘well’-
prefaced turns is providing explanation on procedural matters and legal concepts as well as 
initiating face threat mitigation.   
By illustrating the uses of ‘well’ and functions of judges’ ‘well’-initiated turns during 
procedural discussions, the article shows how a corpus linguistics approach can help to trace 
specific linguistic features to uncover more general aspects useful for other disciplines (e.g. 
legal studies). If the interdisciplinary approach is taken into account from the very beginning 
of the process of corpus building, the corpus can be re-used for purposes not originally 
envisioned. The presented corpus has potential for being constantly supplemented and further 
exploited for developing materials for the judiciary or for developing practical handbook-
style information packages for litigants in person. 
A similar approach shown here can be used to analyse how the meaning of common legal 
concepts (e.g. ‘evidence’, ‘opening speech’, ‘cross-examination’) is negotiated and explained 
to litigants in person in practice. Although many judges have personal experience with 
litigants in person struggling with these concepts (Trinder et al 2014), samples from court 
interaction can help judges practice clearer explanation strategies. This would give specific 
initiatives for the training of the judiciary but also inform personal support units and first tier 
support organisation (e.g. Personal Support Units) on what aspects to base their guidance 
materials and how to help litigants in person.  
  
A corpus approach provides a firm methodological basis for socio-legal studies as it presents 
an opportunity to work with real-life interactions. Corpora can be used as a complementary 
methodological tool in addition to empirical research methods, questionnaires, interviews and 
other socio-legal research methods.  
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